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APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Case No. 16876 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
This is an action by the heirs to enforce a 
promissory note. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to a jury which rendered a 
verdict that there was a material and fraudulent alteration 
in the promissory note. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks an order reversing the District 
Court and entering Judgment for plaintiff for the amount of 
the unpaid balance of the note plus interest and costs, or, 
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in the alternative, ordering a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This is an action by the heirs of Glen S. Humpherys 
to enforce a promissory note (Exhibit P-2) dated December 30, 
1967. The promissory note was given to Glen S. Humpherys as 
part of an agreement (Exhibit P-3) between defendant and Glen 
S. Humpherys in accordance with which Glen S. Humpherys sold 
and delivered to defendants his drug store inventory, prescrip-
tion inventory, and prescription files. 
The agreement provided that an inventory be taken of 
the drugstore items by "The Rocky Mountain Wholesale Inventory 
Crew" and the value-determined to set the sales price, part of 
which was to be paid by def f ered payment as provided in the 
note (Exhibit P-2). 
The defendants made periodic payments to Glen S. 
Humpherys from February 2, 1968, until April 30, 1975, when 
Mr. Humpherys died. Defendant then made payments in May, June, 
August, September and November of 1975 to Glen S. Humpherys' 
heir~, at which time defendants refused to make additional pay-
ments. The ur.paid balance of the note, as found by the jury, 
was $12,693.81. (R. 113) 
During the course of the trial, the defendants were 
permitted to testify that the ,promissory note in question was 
signed by them at a time when the amount of the note was blank 
-2-
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and that they did not know who completed the blanKs. J.ne 
plaintiff objected to the questions giving rise to the 
above testimony, on the ground that the defendants were not 
competent to be a witness to such facts as.provided by 
Section 78-24-2 UCA 1953 (the dead man's statute). (T-27-
29) 
After both sides had rested their respective cases, 
plaintiff made a motion for a directed verdict which was 
taken under advisement. 
The following jury instruction to which plaintiff 
took exception was given: 
"The Plaintiffs claim that the Defendants, 
on or about December 30, 1967, executed and 
delivered to Glen S · ..: Humpherys a promissory 
note, ·and that the Plaintiffs are the owners 
and holders of said note because of the death 
of Glen S. Humpherys. The Plaintiffs further 
claim that there is a balance owing on the note 
which has not been paid. 
"The Defendants admit that they signed the 
promissory note in blank, that the amount and 
date of the note were not filled in at the time 
the Defendants signed the same. The Defendants 
claim that the amount and date of. the note were 
filled in without their knowledge or permission. 
"You are instructed that any alteration of 
a promissory note is material which changes the 
contract of any part thereto in any respect, 
including any such change in an incomplete instru-
ment, by completing it otherwise than as author-
ized. But there is no material alteration of a 
promissory note if the holder completes an in-
complete instrument as authorized by the maker or 
makers. 
"You are further instructed that fraudulent 
consists of sotne deceitful ·practice or willful 
device resorted to with intent to deprive another 
of his right or in some manner to do him an injury." 
(R. 100) 
-3-
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The case was submitted to the jury on a special 
verdict. Question No. l, to which plaintiffs took exception·, 
was a.s follows: 
"Was there any fraudulent and material 
alteration of the promissory note now bea~ing 
date of December 30, 1967, by the plaintiffs, 
or any of them, or by Glen S. Humpherys: 
ANSWER 'YES' or 'NO': Yes " 
The special interrogatory was answered in the 
affirmative. 
The other special interrogatories and the answers 
as found by the jury are as follows: 
.,Question No. 2: 
"State how much money, if any, has been paid 
to Glen S. Humpherys or to the plaintiffs on the· 
note bearing ~ate of December 30, 1967, by stating 
the amount paid on 
A. The Principal $ 12,496.93 
B. The Interest $ 6,197.73" 
and give the date and amount of the last payment on 
Amount of Date of 
Last Payment Last Paym~nt 
A. The Principal $ 35.11 11/1/75 
B. The Interest $ 64.89 '11/1/75 
"Question No·. 3: 
"Give the amount of a reasonable attorney's fee for 
bringing this action. 
$ -0- " 
-4-
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The following was added by the jury without instruc-
tion and not responding to any special question: 
"We recommend that plaintiff remove the items 
in question from the basement of Mack's Pharmacy. 
We also feel that plaintiff does not have a valid 
case because of insufficient evidence." (R. 113) 
The jury ruled that there was a fraudulent and 
material alteration of the promissory note in question. 
Plaintiff made a motion for a judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict and for a new trial based upon admission of evidence 
.which should have been excluded by Section 78-24-2, UCA 1953, 
and that the defendants, after admitting their signatures, 
had not introduced any evidence to prove that there was an 
unauthorized completion of the promissory note in question. 
(R. 115) 
The motions were denied by the trial judge and a 
memorandum decision was issued. (R. 133) The decision stated 
in part ... "no evidence was presented as to any inventory being 
taken and the jury could believe the amount on the note was 
entered without authority". 
Prior to and during the time this lawsuit was pend-
ing, plaintiff had been searching for the evidence of the 
inventory. (See Affidavit of Nanette Dixon). On February 3, 
1979, after the case had been appealed, plaintiff discovered 
the evidence which set forth the inventory, including the origi-
nal adding machine tapes made in the inventory process and the 
suimilary, hereafter referred to as "new evidence", the originals 
-5-
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of which are attached to the affidavit of Mr. G. Don Kennedy 
which is filed to support plaintiffs' motion to vacate the 
judgment and for an order for a new trial. All of these 
documents are filed with plaintiffs' motion to stay the appeal 
pending a ruling by the district court to vacate the judgment 
and for a new trial or in the alternative to dismiss the appea: 
without prejudice to another appeal on the same issues after 
disposition of plaintiffs' motion for a new trial in the dis-
trict court based upon the ground of newly discovered evidence 
and upon the ground that the Judgment should be vacated in the 
interest of justice in view of the newly discovered evidence. 
(R. 152) 
Becau~e an appeal was pending ~t the time the above 
motion was filed, Plaintiff made a motion to the Supreme Court 
to dismiss the appeal without prejudice to another appeal after 
consideration of plaintiffs' motion. This motion was granted, 
after which the trial court denied plaintiffs' motion for a 
new trial (R. 181) on the grounds that the newly discovered 
evidence could have been discovered by due diligence ~nd that 
the new evidence would not have changed the result. 
-6-
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ARGUMENT 
I 
THAT THE JURY'S SPECIAL VERDICT 
WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY COMPETENT EVIDENCE 
A. THAT THERE WAS NO FRATJDIILENT AND MATE.RIAL 
ALTERATION. 
The promissory note in question is typed with lines 
provided for the amount, both numerically and written out, and 
for the date. These items have been written in in pen and ink. 
There is no indication of erasures, alterations, cross-outs, or 
other changes. There is nothing to indicate an improper or 
unauthorized completion. It is common practice to negotiate 
checks and other negotiable instruments completed in such a 
fashion. That is, with the amount or date, or both, completed 
by typewriter, rubber stamp, or in handwriting obviously differ-
ent than the signature on such document. 
Section 70A-3-307 UCA 1953, Subsection (2) provides: 
"When signatures are admitted or established, 
production of the instrument entitles a holder 
to recover on it unless the defendant establishes 
a defense." 
In the instant case, defendants admitted that they signed the 
promissory note in question. The above quoted section there-
fore places the burden of proving a defense on the defendant. 
This is consistent with general case law. 
-7-
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In Section 652 of 11 CJS 45, it is stated: 
" .... it is presumed that notes valid on their 
face were executed without fraud on the part of 
the payee .... " 
and further it is stated: 
"The burden of proof on issues raised by defendant's 
denial of the validity of the instrument is on him 
where he admits execution thereof .... " 
Defendants, as a defense, have asserted that the 
note was signed in blank and that _the completion of the blanks 
by whomever made, was unauthorized. Incomplete instruments arE 
discussed in Section 70A-3-115 UCA 1953: 
"70A-3_-115. Incomplete instruments. --- (1) When 
a paper whose contents at the time of signing show 
that it is intended to become an instrument is 
signed while still incomplete in any necessary 
respect, it cannot be enforced until completed, 
but when it is completed in accordance with 
authority given, it is effective as completed. 
"(2) If the completion is unauthorized, the rules 
as to material alteration apply (section 70A-3-407), 
even though the paper was not delivered by the 
maker or drawer; but the burden of establishing 
that any completion is unauthorized is on the 
party so asserting." (emphasis added) 
In view of the above, the statutory law of Utah 
grants recovery by plaintiff on a promissory note even if in-
complete when signed by defendants unless defendant can estab-
lish a defense. The statute places the burden of proving that 
any completion is unauthorized squarely on the defendants as 
they are asserting that the blanks were completed without 
authority. 
-8-
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"The purpose of a trial of the issues is to 
have the facts.determined impartially and fairly 
by a court or Jury. Jurors as well as judges 
must base their verdicts or decisions on the 
evidence presented during the trial, not on the 
basis of some independent personal investigation 
or determination of the facts outside of court.°' 
Provo River Water Users Association vs. Carlson, 
6 U 2d 161, 308 P2d 264, p. 782. 
B. THAT THE EVIDENCE THAT THE PROMISSORY NOTE WAS 
SIGNED IN BLANK WAS NOT COMPETENT. 
During the trial the only evidence of unauthorized 
completion introduced by defendants was in response to questions 
relating to the execution of the note and to other statements, 
transactions, and matters of fact equally within the knowledge 
of the defendants and Glen S. Humpherys who died May 7, 1975, 
and who is the payee of the promissory note in question and 
from whom plaintiffs inherited said note. 
Section 78-24-2 UCA 1953, also referred to as the 
"dead man's statute" is set out below, with emphasis added: 
"78-24-2. Who may not be witnesses. ----The follow-
ing persons cannot be witnesses: 
"(l) Those who are of unsound mind at the time 
of their production for examination. 
"(2) Children under ten years of age, who appear 
incapable of receiving just impressions of the 
facts respecting which they are examined, or of 
relating them truly. 
"(3) civil action, suit or 
ing, an any person irect y intereste in t e 
event thereof, and any person from, through or under 
whom such party or interested person derived his 
interest or title or any part thereof, when the 
-9-
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such action, suit or roceed-
in claims or o oses, sues, or e ends, as 
guar ian o an insane or incompetent person, 
or as the executor or administrator, heir, lega-
tee-, -or devisee of ·an dec·eased erson, or as 
guar ian, assignee or grantee, :-rect y or remote-
ly, of such heir, legatee or d7visee, as to any 
statement by, or transaction with, such deceased, 
insane or incompetent person or matter of fact 
whatever, which must have been equall within 
t e now e ge o ot t e witness· an sue insane, 
incompetent or deceased person, unless such wit-
ness is called to testify thereto by such adverse 
party so claiming or opposing suing or defending, 
in such action, suit or proceeding." 
Plaintiffs objected to the answe~ing of the questioru 
concerning the form of the note when executed and to other 
questions relating to the completion of the note or to authorit 
for completing the note on grounds of defendants' incompetency 
based on the dead man's statute quoted above. (T. 27 and T. ST 
All of defendants' testimony concerning the completion of the 
note was of such a nature as to have been equally within the 
knowledge of defendants and the dead man, Glen S. Humpherys, anc 
should have been excluded. 
The application to the facts of the instant case is a 
classic example of the reasons for the enactment of the dead man 
statute. The promissory note in question is regular upon its 
face and under the statute cited is enforceable by plaintiffs 
upon proof of the signatures. The evidence of almost eight (8) 
years of payment, (Ex. P-4 and 5), the admission by defendant 
that he had deducted interest for this loan from his tax re-
turn (T. 34), together with the lack of any evidence that 
-10-
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that defendants acted otherwise than as though they were obli-
gated on the note until Mr. HumpherysJ death further reinforces 
the validity of the note. Allowing defendants to testify that 
the note was blank when signed or completed without authority 
circumvented the dead man's statute as such matters were equally 
within the knowledge of defendants and the deceased. This is 
the kind of evidence intended to be inadmissible as it is self-
serving, for defendantst benefit, and impossible for the plain-· 
tiffs to counter without the testimony of the deceased payee. 
In such cases, the _legislature, by enacting Section 78-24-2 UCA 
.. ' 
1953, has set forth the basic policy to protect heirs of deceased 
persons from being subject to evidence that they cannot possibly 
meet because of the death of their only witness. 
A similar situation results when one is a holder in 
due course. Section 70A-3-407 UCA 1953, expressly states that 
a holder in due course may enforce an instrument which has been 
completed after execution as it is completed. Further, a person 
1 who by his negligence substantially contributes to an alteration 
is precluded from asserting the alteration against a holder in 
due course. See 70A-3-406 UCA 1953. 
The statutory law relating to a holder in due course 
is another example of the legislature enacting statutes to 
protect persons from the unfair positi.on of defending against 
an asserted fact which such person has no chance to prove. As 
with the dead man's statute, the legislature has decided that 
-11-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the benefit of the doubt should be given to the party with the 
objective evidence as the written promissory note, rather than 
allowing the self-serving statements of an interested party. 
C. THAT THE COURT'S INSTRUCTION NO. 2 AND SPECIAL 
VERDICT NO. 1 WERE IN ERROR AND MISLEAD THE. JURY. 
Jury Instruction No. 2 (R. 100) did not correctly 
state the law as.it should be applied to the instant case. 
The evidence concerning the unauthorized completion and signing 
of the promi~sory note in blank was not competent evidence.and 
should have been excluded in accordance with Section 78-24-2 
UCA 1953. The instruction allowed the jury to base its verdict 
on the self-serving statements of defendants that the note was 
blank and that it was completed without their authorization. 
The only evidence from which the jury could have based its find· 
ings was evidence of a transaction or matter of fact "equally 
within the knowledge of both the witness and·~··· the deceased 
person" and was therefore as a matter of law incompetent evidenc 
There is no possibility of plaintiffs• proving that there was an 
authorized completion of the note to counter defendants' evi-
dence because of the death of Glen S. Humpherys. The instructio 
was duly objected to by plaintiff upon the above grounds. 
(T. 68) 
Question No. ·l of the special verdict (R~ 113) was 
objected to by plaintiff on the same grounds. (T. 68) There 
was no evidence presented to the jury which was competent in 
-12-
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accordance with the dead man's statute. In view of this, 
there was no evidence upon which an affirmative answer could 
be supported at law. Without the testimony of defendants 
that the note was signed in blank, the note appeared to be 
complete and regular upon its face and the jury could not as 
a matter of law find that there was a "fraudulent and material 
alteration". In such case, the note should have been enforced 
as written. 
In a similar situation involving a question of lack 
of consideration, the Utah Supreme Court has applied Section 
78-24-2 UCA 1953. In that case, Burk v·s. Peter, 202 P2d 543, 
, 115 Utah 58, the administratrix commenced an action to enforce 
a promissory note and the makers of the note attempted to 
testify regarding the defense of lack of consideration as did 
, defendants in the instant case. The Supreme Court affirmed 
the trial court's exclusion of the evidence on lack of considera-
tion, stating the following: 
"The court therefore did not err in refusing 
to al~ow appellant to testify concerning the 
alleged lack of consideration for the execution of 
the note since such fact was equally ":~i-thin the 
kn·owledge of a·p·pe11ant and· "de·c·e·a·sed .... " (emphasis 
added) 
The defense of lack of consideration is set forth in 
Section 70A-3-408 UCA 1953 and is treated in a similar manner 
as is the defense of material alteration, that is, each defense 
is effective against one not a holder in due course but cannot 
be asserted against a holder in due course. The dead man's 
-13-
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statute should apply to both defenses in the same manner and 
evidence as to either lack of consideration or material altera· 
tion should be excluded where such evidence was equally within 
the knowledge of the defendants and the deceased as was done 
in Burk vs. Peter, supra. 
The comment made by the jury on the verdict further 
indicates their confusion as to the law and is based upon 
evidence offered by defendant relating to left over items pur-
chased by defendants which evidence was clearly excluded by 
the court during the trial. In addition, the statement was 
not responsive to any question asked of the jury and was not 
in accordance with any instructions given the jury. 
Based upon the jury's answer to special interrogatory 
No. 2, defendants have paid $12,496.93 on the principal of the 
note. The principal-on the face of the note is $25,190.74. In 
view of this, the unpaid balance of the promissory note is 
$12,693.81, and judgment should be entered against defendants 
for such amount. 
II 
THE PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE JUDGMENT 
AND FOR A NEW TRIAL SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED 
A. THE NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE WAS DETERMINATIVE 
OF THE CASE. 
The Affidavit of Nanette Dixon (R. 159) described 
the efforts made to find the inventory to prove the value set 
-14-
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forth on the promissory note and to show that the terms of the 
agreement had been complied with. As her affidavit discloses, 
she searched every conceivable place where such an inventory 
was likely to be prior to the trial. This was over a pe.riod 
of three years. 
The affidavit of G. Don Kennedy, the man who actually 
supervised the taking of the inventory, indicates that he was 
contacted several years prior to the trial in an effort to find 
the inventory and to verify the amounts. 
The items constituting the inventory and attached to 
Mr. Kennedy's affidavit were eventually found in a hunting 
closet in a small box hidden in the back of and between two 
shelves. The items they were with were in no way related to 
the decedent's personal papers or drug store business. There 
was no advantage to or benefit for plaintiff to have not pro-
duced the items at the trial. Plaintiffs knew before the trial 
that the inventory items were an important element of the case 
and had no reason r.ot to produce or try to locate such items 
prior to trial. 
The newly discovered evidence consisted of adding 
~achine tapes, a diagram and a summary of the inventory taken 
by the Rocky Mountain Wholesale Inventory crew of the deceased 
Glen S. Humphrey's drug store in accordance with the agreement 
Exhibit P-3. The affidavit of G. Don Kennedy, who was one of 
the people who took the invento~y in question, (R. 162) identi-
fies the documents as those taken in accordance with the 
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Agreement Exhibit P-3. This evidence is crucial to plaintiff~ 
case as it is the proof of the inventory required in accordanc 
with agreement-P-3 to establish the.value for the deferred pay 
ments provided in the agreement and set out in the Note, Exhib 
P-2. Thus, if in fact the note were signed in blank, the 
inventory taken by the independent inventory crew would estab-
lish the authority to complete the note in accordance with the 
inventory. 
It should be noted that the inventory reflects a 
total value of the inventory of the drug store to be $31,190.7~ 
Defendants introduced certain checks at the trial as defendants 
Exhibit No. 12. One of the ch.eeks, Number 10164, marked defend 
ants' Exhibit No. 6, of Mack's Pharmacy, was signed by defendan 
William M. Stoddard and d·ated 12/30/67 was in the amount of 
$6,000.00. The date corresponds with the date of the promissor 
note, plaintiffs' Exhibit No. 2, and the face of the note equal 
the Inventory of $31,190.74, less the $6,000.00 down payment, 
or $25, 190. 74. Plaintiffs' Exhibit No. 4 reflects the $6, 000 .01 
payment on December 30, 1967. 
The new evidence provides proof of the inventory and 
the amount upon which the sale of Glen's Rexall Drug was based. 
These items provide the information which the memorandum decisic 
stated was necessary to support the completion of the promissor) 
note in question. 
In his memorandum decision (R. 181) dated November 5, 
1979, the trial judge stated: 
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follows: 
"The Court is also of the opinion that the 
newly discovered evidence would not change the 
verdict of the jury. The fact that an inventory 
may have been made would not be evidence that it 
had been received and agreed to by defendants." 
The Agreement, Exhibit P-3, states in part as 
"l. That an inventory of all of said items 
shall be taken by a crew known as THE ROCKY MOUNTAIN 
WHOLESALE INVENTORY CREW on the 31st day of n·ecember, 
1967. Said inventory so taken shall keep separate 
the prescription items which include the bottles, 
vials, etc .. , and pharmaceutical supplies used in the 
sale of prescriptions as one item, so that the value 
thereof may be determined separately and the balance 
of all of the merchandise shall be kept in another 
separate group. 
·"2. That the prescription items and the values 
thereof, when so determined, shall be paid for at 
the amount determined immediately after the taking 
thereof. That the value of the balance of the .items 
taken, when so determined, shall be divided by 
twelve (12) and one-twelth (l/12th) of said amount 
shall be paid each month commencing with the 1st 
day of February, 1968, and to continue thereafter 
each month until a year ~as past; granting to the 
purchasers, however, a grace period of ten (10) 
days from each due date, each month." 
There is no language in the Agreement indicating that 
defendants must agree to the inventory taken. It states that 
the amount determined by the inventory shall be divided by 12 
to determine payments. Thus, the agreement would provide the 
authority to complete the promissory note, 
In addition, the proof of the inventory provides the 
consideration for the note and substantiates· the amount claimed 
to be due to plaintiff and is, therefor, determinative of the 
case. 
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B. BASED UPON THE DISCOVERY OF NEW EVIDENCE WHICH 
BY DUE DILIGENCE COULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISCOVERED. 
Rule 60 of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides 
that relief may be granted from a final judgment where 
." .... (2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence coul1 
not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under 
Rule 59b .... ", and " ... (7) any other reason justifying relief 
from operation of the judgment. The.motion shall be made with· 
in a reasonable time and for reasons ..... (2) .... not more than 
three months after judgment, order or proceeding was entered 
or taken." 
Plaintiffs' motion based upon Rule 60(a)' was filed 
on March 2, 1979, within the three month period (R. 135) of 
the entry of the final order and.was thus timely. The 
importance of the evidence has been previously stated in II A 
above. With respect to the requirement of due d·iligence, 
plaintiff Nanette Dixon filed ·an Affidavit.(R. 159), in which 
she· indicated she began searching for the inventory at about 
the time defendant stopped making payments (November 1975); 
that she spent several days devoted to the search of her 
father's effects; that she contacted one of the men who did 
the inventory, but was advised that no record was maintained 
and that the only records were given.to Mr. Humpherys; that 
she again searched, but was unable to locate the inventory 
documents; that before the trial she again searched without 
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success; and that after all these searches she found the 
inventory of February 3, 1979, in an old hunting closet among 
items unrelated to the drug store or other business items, in 
a location in which she had to bend down to see because of 
its location on the back of a shelf. 
In the trial judge's memorandum, he states (R. 181): 
"The new evidence had been removed from a 
safe and stored in a box in a closet .... " 
This statement is not supported by the evidence. In 
the plaintiff's affidavit, she stated: 
"In. a wooden hunting closet containing some 
shelves with boxes on them and a regular wardrobe 
holding hats, old coats and an old jigsaw puzzle 
box containing items removed from an old safe and 
noticed in the back part of one shelf a small box 
which she would not have seen if she had not been 
bending down. Upon opening this box she discovered 
a diagram, adding machine tapes, and keys to the 
safety deposit boxes." 
The only evidence as to the location of the items was 
the affidavit and does not say the items were ever in the safe 
as indicated in the memorandum decision, but that the items in 
question were near some items removed from an old safe. 
It was never in plaintiffs' interest to fail to locate 
the items making up the inventory, as their presence at trial 
could only help the plaintiffs' case. Plaintiff's description 
of the many searches over the three years, the contact with Mr. 
Kennedy before trial (R. 163), and the finding of the inventory 
in such an unlikely location all indicate due diligence as con-
templated by Rule 60 for relief from a judgment. 
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C. BASED UPON OTHER REASON JUSTIFYING RELIEF FROM 
THE OPERATION OF THE JUDGMENT. 
The newly discovered evidence provides absolute 
independent proof of the value of the drug store inventory 
transferred to defendants as a part of the transaction during 
which Exhibits P-2 and P-3 were executed. It proves the 
authenticity of the amount of the note and is the basis for 
the authority granted by the agreement to complete the note 
if it was in fact signed in blank. Considering the weight the 
new evidence must be given, it would change the result of the 
case and in the interest of justice, a new trial should be 
granted so that the new evidence may be considered. 
III 
THE JURY'S FINDING AS TO ATTORNEY'S FEES 
WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
Tpe jury's findings as to attorneys' fees were not 
supported by the evidence. The only evidence admitted and 
which the jury had available for consideration was that a 
reasonable attorneys' fee for en_~orcing th~ promissory note 
was $3, 320. 00. When this evidence wa·s admitted there was no 
cross-examination and the defendants introduced no eviden-ce 
to contradict the services, reasonableness or amount of fee. 
Thus, the jury's verdict of zero was not supported by any 
evidence. 
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CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the plaintiffs 
were entitled to recover, based upon the proof of the 
defendants having signed the promissory note in question, 
there being no compe~ent evidence to give rise to a defense 
or to support the jury's verdict that there was a fraudulent 
and material alteration. Plaintiff is therefore entitled to 
a judgment for $12,693.81 representing the unpaid balance of 
the note, $3,320.00 attorneys fees, costs, and interest at 
the rate of six percent (6%) per annum. 
In the alternative, plaintiff is entitled to a new 
trial in which to present the newly discovered evidence. 
Respectfully submitted, 
536 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
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CERTTFICATE O'~ MAILING 
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing 
Brief of Appellant was mailed to Defendants-Respondents' 
attorney, postage prepaid, addressed as follows: 
on this 
Dale M. Dorius, Esq. 
Attorney at Law 
P. 0. Box U 
Brigham City, Utah 84302 
day of 
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